Japan\u27s Financial System Reform Law:  Progress Toward Financial Liberalization? by Cargill, Thomas F. & Todd, Gregory F.W.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 19
Issue 1
SYMPOSIUM:
Global Trends Toward Universal Banking:
Comparative Bank Regulation/Meeting The
Regulatory Challenge
Article 2
9-1-1993
Japan's Financial System Reform Law: Progress
Toward Financial Liberalization?
Thomas F. Cargill
Gregory F.W. Todd
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Thomas F. Cargill & Gregory F. Todd, Japan's Financial System Reform Law: Progress Toward Financial Liberalization?, 19 Brook. J. Int'l
L. 47 (1993).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol19/iss1/2
JAPAN'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM
LAW: PROGRESS TOWARD FINANCIAL
LIBERALIZATION?
Thomas F. Cargill and Gregory F.W. Todd*
I. INTRODUCTION
Liquidity is not distributed among economic agents in ac-
cordance with their spending desires: some agents - deficit
agents - desire to spend more than they receive, while others
- surplus agents - desire to spend less than they receive. The
transfer of excess funds from surplus agents to deficit agents is
an essential function of each society's financial system, despite
the many differences in those systems. Banks have traditionally
played a major role in the transfer of funds from surplus to defi-
cit units.
Japan's financial system began a transition in the mid 1970s
that has yet to be completed.' The transition was initiated by a
series of economic and technological forces manifested by oil-
price shocks, government deficits, a shift from a fixed to a flexi-
ble exchange rate regime, and advances in computer and tele-
communications technologies that permitted market innovations
such as the Euromarkets. Market innovations and regulatory re-
forms have reduced barriers between previously distinct finan-
cial and regulatory structures, increased the role of market
forces, and changed financial markets and institutions from rig-
idly regulated and administratively controlled structures to more
open and competitive ones. This process is referred to as "finan-
cial liberalization" in Japan, whereas in the United States the
process is referred to as "deregulation."
The process of financial liberalization in Japan, as in the
United States, has eroded the banks' market share in the flow of
funds by exposing them to competition from non-bank financial
institutions in both deposit markets and in loan markets. During
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1. A taxonomy of financial change applicable to any country is presented in THOMAS
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the 1980s Japanese borrowers became increasingly able to access
the Euromarkets for long-term funding, while the Japanese pen-
sion funds and insurance companies, with ever larger reservoirs
of funds to be invested in portfolio securities, were ready pur-
chasers of such borrowers' securities. Borrowers found lower cost
funding than that available within Japan, cutting the banks out
in the process. Bank profits and capital have also declined dur-
ing the past decade, while at the same time BIS standards on
bank capital have caused Japanese banks to shed loan assets in
order to enhance capital ratios.
The Japanese bank§ have been constrained in responding to
these developments in part by Article 65 of the Japanese Securi-
ties and Exchange Law, enacted during the Allied Occupation
(Occupation) of Japan. Like the United States Glass-Steagall
Act,2 Article 65 imposes a strict separation between banking and
securities activities.' The question of broader bank powers has
therefore been a heated issue in Japan, and bank lobbying for
repeal of Article 65 has intensified as banks have lost market
share in their traditional deposit and loan markets to securities
firms.
In June 1992, following nearly five years of discussions and
reports by private groups and committees appointed by the Jap-
anese Ministry of Finance (MOF),4 the Japanese Diet enacted a
wide-ranging financial reform law5 that, among other measures,
2. Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat.
162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), collectively referred to as
the Glass-Steagall Act, prohibit (i) banks from investing in or underwriting corporate
securities; (ii) banks from affiliating with securities firms; (iii) securities firms from en-
gaging in the business of deposit-taking; and, (iv) bank directors, officers, and employees
from serving as directors, officers, or employees of securities firms.
3. Although Article 65 applies only to securities activities of banks, the Banking
Law of Japan, Law No. 59 of 1981, restricts banks from engaging in any activities other
than banking and matters appropriately related thereto. See infra note 34. The question
of expanded bank powers therefore also expands to matters such as insurance powers
and cross-ownership between banks and nonfinancial firms, which are currently under
study in Japan.
4. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. A brief summary of these discussions
can be found in Shoichi Royama, On the Financial Reform in Japan, in CPITAL MAR-
KETS AND FiNANcIAL SERWICES IN JAPAN 2, 4-7 (1992).
5. Law Concerning the Realignment of Relevant Laws for the Reform of the Finan-
cial System and the Securities Trading System, Law No. 87 of 1992, translated in The
Amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law to Insure the Fairness of Securities
Trading (Part I), CAMRI REV., Apr. 1992, at 2; The Amendment to the Securities and
Exchange Law (Part II), CAMRI REv., June 1992, at 2 [hereinafter the Law or Financial
System Reform Law]. The Financial System Reform Law is a comprehensive law that
affects various aspects of the Japanese financial system - amending 15 other laws and
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permits the mutual entry of banks and securities firms into each
others' markets through subsidiaries. The Law therefore does
not completely dismantle the Article 65 barrier, and firewalls
will be implemented to keep banking and securities activities
separate to a greater or lesser degree. Furthermore, the impact
of the Law will be delayed over several years, with staggered en-
tries for different types of financial market participants and with
queues to be established by the MOF to prevent market "confu-
sion." Thus, the Law will not trigger a "Big Bang" in liberalizing
Japan's financial system.
Since the Occupation forces initially imposed the separation
of securities and banking on Japan, it has been generally as-
sumed that Japan would significantly modify Article 65 only af-
ter the United States had made'similar amendments to Glass-
Steagall.6 It is therefore ironic that Japan has lowered its Glass-
Steagall barrier ahead of the United States. It is also ironic that
the Law has been enacted at a time of serious reversals in the
Japanese stock and real estate markets, on-going scandals in the
securities markets, a growing nonperforming loan problem in the
banking system, and a recession that appears more serious than
previously anticipated. The business opportunities eagerly
sought by securities and banking groups throughout the 1980s
seem now far less appealing.
There are various reasons to study Japan's approach, to the
issue of banking and securities businesses, some of which are ob-
vious while others are more subtle. First, Japan's status as the
world's second largest economy and largest creditor nation en-
sures that any significant change in Japan's financial structure
will have important implications for global finance and trade. At
a minimum, Japan's action seems likely to intensify pressure in
the United States to further reduce Glass-Steagall restrictions.
Second, in contrast to the United States and other western
economies, a major characteristic of Japanese finance from its
beginnings in 1868 has been the role played by negotiated,
rather than market, transactions. Japan's financial structure has
accordingly not relied on market-oriented transactions, open
markets, financial disclosure, or a legal system that codifies per-
missible and impermissible activities to the same extent as many
abolishing one other.
6. See, e.g., ARON VINER, INSME JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETs 34 (1987). ("The Jap-
anese side of the pair is immortal so long as its elder American brother survives. The
death of the senior twin, however, will assure the demise of the junior.").
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western financial systems. A shift by the Japanese banks to-
wards more open and competitive transactions in the securities
markets would be significant in light of the structure of the fi-
nancial system of the early 1970s.
Third, Japan's rise to its position as the world's second larg-
est economy, and its mushrooming current account surpluses,
have attracted criticism of its financial transition process. The
United States in particular has pressured Japan to increase its
pace of liberalization, to increase foreign access to Japan's do-
mestic financial markets, and to internationalize the yen. A shift
towards more open securities markets would represent a major
response to these criticisms.
Fourth, Japan's financial transition has been one of the
least disruptive among the industrial countries of the world, at
least through the end of the 1980s.7 Japan's macroeconomic rec-
ord during the past two decades has been among the best in the
world, despite oil price shocks, a shift to a floating exchange rate
regime, a shift in the economy's underlying growth path, and
ongoing financial transition. The collapse of the stock and real
estate markets, beginning in late 1989, has marred this record,
however, and the question may be asked whether the shift to-
ward broader bank powers announced by the Financial System
Reform Law is taking place at the most appropriate time.
This paper first presents a background on the banking sys-
tem in Japan, tracing liberalization movements over the last
twenty years. The paper then turns to a discussion of Article 65
and the impact of the Financial System Reform Law on that
provision. The paper ends with some observations on Japan's
approach to the Glass-Steagal issue, and a prognosis for future
developments in Japan.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE BANKING SYSTEM
Banking and finance in Japan have experienced three tran-
sitional stages over roughly the last century. These can be
roughly divided into the periods from 1868 to World War II,
from the end of the war to the 1970s, and from the 1970s to the
7. This is largely because the Bank of Japan has been permitted to pursue a price
stabilization policy. See CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 1, at 166; Thomas F. Cargill &
Michael M. Hutchison, The Response of the Bank of Japan to Macroeconomic and Fi-
nancial Change, in MONETARY POLICY IN PACIFIC BASIN COUNTRIES 227, 235 (Hang-Sheng
Cheng ed., 1988).
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present." Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan first
adopted a national policy of industrialization to achieve eco-
nomic parity with the West. Banks, including various specialized
financial institutions, were established to mobilize the country's
financial resources in support of industrialization and economic
growth. Since that time, banking and finance have been one and
the same, with private non-bank financial institutions and direct
securities markets playing only minor roles in Japan's financial
development until recently.9
Six characteristics of this period may be noted. First, the
industrial structure was dominated by the zaibatsu - large con-
glomerates owned and managed by wealthy families - in which
banks played a secondary role. The zaibatsu banks however be-
came powerful institutions; by 1914, the five largest banks con-
trolled approximately twenty percent of the loans and deposits
in the ordinary banking system, a figure that grew to about forty
percent in 1935, while by 1930, sixty percent of savings deposits
and seventy percent of trust assets were held by zaibatsu-con-
trolled institutions. 10 Second, financial panics in the 1920s led to
steep reductions in the number of banks to permit better regula-
tory oversight, and this consolidation continued through the end
of World War II; the number of banks in Japan dropped from
1,697 in 1905 to 424 in 1936, dropping still further for ordinary
banks from 377 in 1937 to 61 by 1945.1" Third, limits on compe-
tition were self-imposed by cartels and agreements among differ-
8. The second phase can alternatively be said to have ended in the 1920s when the
government began greatly to expand its regulatory control over the financial system.
Government control increased further under the military regimes of the 1930s, culminat-
ing with wartime controls over the entire financial system. This process did not termi-
nate after the war, however, despite various Occupation reforms. Indeed, wartime finan-
cial controls formed the basis of the government's post-war regulatory controls over the
economy. WILLIAM TsuTsui, BANKING POLICY IN JAPAN 9-17, 124-25 (1988). For a chronol-
ogy of regulatory actions in Japan from 1975 to 1991, see Thomas, F. Cargill & Shoichi
Royama, The Evolution of Japanese Banking and Finance, in BANKING STRUCTURES OF
MAJOR COUNTRmS 333, 376-88, 591 (George G. Kaufman ed., 1992).
9. The first stock exchanges in Japan were established in 1878, but these markets
were speculative, without a true capital market function. The zaibatsu system permitted
financing of corporate enterprise within the zaibatsu groups, as the main banks provided
both short-term working capital loans and long-term "frozen" loans that became a per-
manent part of the capital of the zaibatsu enterprises. FEDERATION OF BANKERS AssociA-
TIONS OF JAPAN, BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN 3 (1984); see generally TsuTsui, supra note 8,
at 5.
10. TsuTsUI, supra note 8, at 7, app. I at 127.
11. See Frances Rosenbluth, The Political Economy of Financial Reform in Japan:
The Banking Act of 1982, 6 PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 81-82 (1989).
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ent zaibatsu, supported by explicit or tacit government ap-
proval.12 Fourth, the financial system was internationally
isolated. Fifth, financial transactions were generally made on a
secured basis only.13 Sixth, financial transactions were negoti-
ated, rather than market-oriented, so that borrower-lender rela-
tionships have been characterized by many more aspects than
the quantity and the price of funds exchanged. 4 Estimates indi-
cate that indirectly negotiated transactions have played a far
more important role in Japan than in the United States, and
that banks have provided a more important conduit for transfer-
ring funds in Japan than in the United States.1 5
Japan experienced its high growth period from the end of
the war to the early 1970s, when real output grew at annual
rates of around ten percent. Despite various Occupation reforms,
the banking and financial system of the post-war period contin-
ued trends firmly established in the 1930s, including a pattern of
activist intervention in the financial system that was to be given
a new focus after the war.16 A small number'of banks dominated
the flow of funds, domestic finance remained insulated from in-
ternational forces, the financial system was designed to support
industrialization and rapid growth, households were excluded
from the financial system as fund users, financial transactions
continued to be collateralized, and negotiated transactions domi-
nated the financial system. Securities markets remained unde-
veloped for both private and public sector obligations, as the li-
quidity needs of the private sector were met by banks, and the
small amounts of government debt that began to be issued after
1965 were absorbed by a captive syndicate of financial institu-
12. See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 109-12 (1982).
13. From the 1920s, especially after losses suffered in the financial panic of 1927,
most financing in Japan has required collateralization, including corporate bond issues,
bank lending, and interbank transactions. See THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 43-44
(Yoshio Suzuki 6d., 1990). Among other factors, this requirement has retarded the devel-
opment of a corporate bond market. See discussion infra note 126.
14. This distinction is similar to that made by Professor Williamson between mar-
kets and hierarchies; however, it is not easily amenable to measurement. OLIVER E. WIL-
LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
15. See CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 1, for a decomposition of the Japanese and
U.S. flows of funds over the period from 1954 to 1985 in terms of a four-part taxonomy:
indirect-negotiated, indirect-open market, direct-negotiated, and direct-open market
(based on a study in SHOICHI ROYAMA, FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION (1986)).
16. See Koichi Hamada & Akiyoshi Horiuchi, The Political Economy of the Finan-
cial Market, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN, 1 THE DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION 223
(Kozo Yamamura & Yasukichi Yasuba eds., 1987).
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tions and securities companies.
Three discernable changes occurred however during the
post-war period. Explicit regulatory powers introduced during
the 1930s and wartime were refocused to impose a wide range of
portfolio constraints on market participants to rebuild the econ-
omy. Virtually all interest rates were regulated, financial institu-
tions were assigned specialized roles,18 and broad-based credit
allocation controls were implemented. The MOF became the pri-
mary regulatory authority of Japan,19 followed by the Bank of
Japan (BOJ) and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
was a distant third.20 Regulation of the financial system was en-
17. The "Dodge Line" of fiscal policy during the Occupation required Japan to fol-
low a strict policy of balanced budgets, despite the Ministry of Finance's (MOF) strong
preference toward deficit financing to revitalize the economy. Government bonds were
not issued until 1965, when limited deficit financing was first permitted at below-market
cost to offset declining tax revenues through a captive government syndicate comprised
primarily of banks. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) repurchased about 90% of each issue of
bonds after one year in order to free up the banks' capital. KAzuo TATEWAKI, BANKING
AND FINANCE IN JAPAN 27-28 (1991); see also Rosenbluth, supra note 11, at 68-69.
18. The Japanese post-war financial system is characterized by a high degree of spe-
cialization among different financial institutions. The principal Japanese banks are clas-
sified as city banks, regional banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. A variety of
other specialized institutions exist for small business and for agricultural, forestry, and
fishery groups. See BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 9, at 28-39; THE JAPANESE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 163-70; TATEwAIU, supra note 17, at 99.
19. The MOF regulates substantially all private and public financial institutions in
Japan, combining the functions of the United States Treasury, Office of Management
and Budget, Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commission, Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, and all of the state banking and insurance regulators, as well as the
supervisory functions of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration and the Office of Thrift Supervision. MAUREEN LEBLANC & ANDREW C. SVARRE,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 2 (1988). In
addition it administers the gigantic Trust Fund Bureau (comprised primarily of postal
savings and welfare and national pension funds) and appoints the heads of specialized
government financial institutions as well as the managing directors, advisors, and audi-
tors of the BOJ. Securities activities are supervised through the MOF's Securities Bu-
reau, while banking is supervised through the Banking Bureau. See, e.g., TATEWAKI,
supra note 17, at 143-45, 175-78. Not all financial institutions are regulated fully by the
MOF, however. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has jurisdic-
tion over leasing and installment credit companies, the Ministry of Agriculture shares
oversight responsibilities for the agricultural co-operatives in Japan, including the
Norinchkin Bank, and the Ministry of Construction oversees securitized interests in real
estate (which are not considered "securities" for purposes of Japanese law).
20. The BOJ regulates the money supply and maintains orderly credit conditions in
the financial system. See, e.g., THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 305.
The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications is the repository for the vast Postal Sav-
ings System, in which fixed amount savings in March 1989 stood at Y125.9 trillion, about
the same as all personal deposit balances in the private banking system. TATEWAKI,
supra note 17, at 142. The overall regulatory structures of Japan and the United States
are compared in THOMAS F. CARGILL, CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND REGULATORY RE-
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forced through a mixture of formal written regulations and in-
formal, unwritten administrative guidance.21 Such regulation led
to a highly controlled flow of funds from the household sector to
the funds-poor corporate sector: city banks and regional banks
offered short-term deposits and loans to large corporations and
to smaller businesses, respectively, while long-term credit banks
and trust banks took long-term deposits and made long-term
loans.22
The second significant change in the post-war period was
that city banks (and some larger regional banks) shifted from
their secondary role in the pre-war zaibatsu to a leadership role
in the post-war keiretsu - the headless corporate groups that
characterize Japanese business today. The emergence of banks
as leaders within the keiretsu is reflected in the phrase, "main
bank system," which describes Japanese corporations' depen-
dence on their main bank for both long- and short-term
financing.23
The third change in the post-war period was the Occupa-
tion's effort to change the structure of Japanese finance. The
SPONSIBILITY: THE BANK OF JAPAN AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE (1989).
21. "Administrative guidance" (gy)-sei shido-) refers to the Japanese government's
practice of issuing directives, requests, etc., to regulated parties within such ministries'
jurisdiction and to obtain such parties' compliance with administrative objectives,
whether or not based on specific statutory authority. See, e.g., Yoriatzi Narita, Gy-osei
Shid'5 [Administrative Guidance], translated in 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1968); JOHNSON,
supra note 12, at 265. Technically non-binding, and often oral, administrative guidance
gives the regulatory authorities significant flexibility to mold regulations to changing cir-
cumstances and to develop ad hoc solutions as problems arise, without giving particular
concern for the precedential implications of the action. Administrative guidance, in the
sense of extra-legal administrative cajoling or encouragement, is not unique to Japan, for
in the United States as well, government bureaucracies jawbone, advise, withhold per-
missions, etc., in order to obtain desired objectives. However, the pervasiveness of ad-
ministrative guidance in Japan, and the widespread acceptance by those affected by it,
distinguish it from comparable administrative action in the United States.
22. Foreign banks played a minor role, being restricted primarily to providing "im-
pact" or foreign currency loans not authorized to the Japanese banks. CARGILL &
ROYAMA, supra note 1, at 20-57, presents a detailed set of flow of funds accounts for
Japan over the period from 1954 to 1985.
23. See C.D. Elston, The Financing of Japanese Industry, BANK OF ENGLAND Q.
BULL. 510-18 (Dec. 1981). See also CARGIL & ROYAMA, supra note 1, at 46. This depen-
dence is one of the primary concerns raised by the securities industry over expanded
bank securities powers, since bank control over keiretsu borrowers creates a captive mar-
ket for securities services to be offered by banks or their subsidiaries. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COUNCIL, How BASIC SYsTEMs REGARDING CAPITAL MARKET OUGHT TO BE RE-
FORMED 18 (Capital Markets Res. Inst. trans., 1991) [hereinafter SECURTIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COUNCIL FINAL REPORT]; SHKEN DANTAI KYOGIKA1, KINYIu SEiDll KAIKAKU RONGI
NO MONDAI TEN 24-25 (1989).
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Occupation's principal reform was to dissolve the zaibatsu, in an
effort to democratize post-war Japan and to make its industrial
structure more competitive.24 The dissolutions, however, fell
short of their original target.25 While they eliminated family con-
trol of the zaibatsu, company groups soon re-emerged in the
form of keiretsu, often centered around a pre-war "main
bank."26 The Occupation's second financial reform was the
adoption of Article 65.27 In other respects, however, while the
Occupation initially sought broad reform of the financial system,
the banking system was ultimately left relatively untouched by
the Occupation.28
The third stage of Japan's financial development dates from
the 1970s, when a variety of forces converged to drive Japan's
financial system toward a more flexible, open, and international-
ized structure. The principal agent of change in the Japanese
financial system was the combined effect of the "oil shock" of
1973-74 and the vast increase in government debt financing that
followed. The oil shock disrupted Japan's financial development,
causing a downward shift in the underlying growth path and a
resulting change in the flow of funds within Japan. It also trig-
gered a 'doubling of the central government and overall public
24. See T.F.M. ADAMS & IWAo Hosmis, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE NEw JAPAN 23-
25 (1972).
25. In 1946, the Edwards State-War Mission on Japanese Combines called for the
severing of all ownership, personnel, and contractual and financial ties within the
zaibatsu, and the deconcentration of the largest companies into smaller units which
would not constitute a material or potential threat to competitive enterprise. TSUTSUI,
supra note 8, at 42-43. Instead, only a more limited dissolution, suggested voluntarily by
the Yasuda zaibatsu itself, was followed. Only the holding company was liquidated and
its stockholdings transferred to a liquidation commission for ultimate distribution to the
public, without severing relationships among those companies or breaking up large com-
panies into smaller components. TSUTSUI, supra note 8, at 41-46.
26. Of the seven largest banks in Japan, six are direct successors to zaibatsu banks,
and their keiretsu groups continue to dominate Japan's industrial structure. See, e.g.,
Marie Anchordoguy, A Brief History of Japan's Keiretsu, 6 HARv. Bus. REV. 58-59
(July-Aug. 1990); Maruyama Yoshinari, The Big Six Horizontal Keiretsu, 39 JAPAN Q.
186, 188 (1992).
27. Occupation forces also attempted to restructure the BOJ along the lines of the
Federal Reserve System's Board of Governors, which proved a futile exercise. TsUTSUI,
supra note 8, at 78, 85-89.
28. While Antitrust and Cartels Division of Economic and Scientific Section of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) urged overhaul of the banking sys-
tem, Finance Division feared that tinkering with the nation's banks would invite finan-
cial disaster. The Finance Division, with the backing of Washington as the "reverse
course" took hold, and eventually won out. TsUTSUl, supra note 8, at 56-59.
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sector deficits,2 9 which proved increasingly difficult for the MOF
to fund - especially since the financial system operated without
open money and capital markets. The MOF was forced, there-
fore, to rely ever more heavily on the banks to fund purchases of
mushrooming government debt. When the BOJ signalled that it
would no longer assure guaranteed repurchases of such debt one
year from issuance at original purchase cost, the banks resisted
MOF's efforts to place the government debt with them unless
they received financial liberalizations in return.30
Liberalizations were demanded by different groups, each
with its own interests. The banks sought liberalization because
they had lost market share in 'the total flow of funds since the
decline in the corporate sector deficit reduced that sector's de-
pendence on bank credit. Securities companies sought liberaliza-
tion because the development of open money and capital mar-
kets, and the internationalization of finance, offered new
opportunities to expand their role in the financial system. The
corporate sector became an advocate for liberalization because it
experienced an increase in liquidity after 1973 as a result of a
slower rate of investment. Corporations became less dependent
on the banking system and found that they could get by without
maintaining the large compensating balances typically required
by banks during the high-growth period. Thus, the corporate
sector saw liberalization as a way to enhance profits and diver-
sify into financial asset management. The household sector be-
came an advocate for liberalization because high rates of real in-
come growth no longer compensated for the limited set of
financial assets available at regulated rates of return.
Spurred on by two other catalysts for financial reform -
the abandonment of fixed exchange rates after 1973 and pres-
sures by the United States for reform in the early 1980s 3 1 _
Japan has carried out regulatory reforms that have fundamen-
29. The corporate sector deficit decreased by 50% during this period. In Japan's
high growth period, the central government sector generally operated with a small sur-
plus, although combined with other public sector deficits, the overall public sector was a
deficit sector approximately equal to one-third the size of the corporate sector deficit.
See CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 1.
30. See CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 1, at 117; ROBERT A. FELDMAN, JAPANESE
FINANCIAL MARKETS: DEFICITS, DILEMMAS, AND DEREGULATION 50-51 (1986); Rosenbluth,
supra note 11, at 68-75.
31. The worsening trade deficit with Japan prompted the United States to seek to
"internationalize" the yen, to increase foreign financial institution access to Japan's mar-
kets, and to increase the pace of Japanese domestic liberalizations generally.
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tally altered its financial structure. Loan rates have been deregu-
lated for over a decade, and large deposits (over about $20,000)
have been unregulated, with liberalization of small deposits
scheduled for 1993. Primary and secondary money and capital
markets have expanded greatly, and corporations have relied
more on capital markets than in the past, although most of the
growth in the bond market is attributable to government deficit
financing rather than the corporate sector. Interest rates in
money and capital markets are market determined, and there is
a close relationship between domestic money market rates (such
as the gensaki rate on government bond repurchase agreements)
and international rates. Japan has made significant progress to-
ward unrestricted capital inflows and outflows. The value of the
yen is market determined, and the yen has gradually become a
more desirable reserve and investment asset. Foreign participa-
tion in Japan's financial system has increased significantly in the
past decade, as has Japanese banking presence in other coun-
tries, and Japan's financial system has become an important
component of the international financial environment. These
changes, however, have still done little to encourage corporate
bond markets or to eliminate binding barriers between different
financial institutions and between direct and indirect markets.
III. THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND SECURITIES AcTIvITiES IN
JAPAN: ARTICLE 65 AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM LAW OF
1992
A. Article 6532
Article 65 of the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law ex-
32. Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948 (amended), art. 65 (Capital
Markets Research Inst. trans., 1988). [hereinafter SEL]. SEL, art. 2, T 8 defines securi-
ties business as "the business conducted by any person other than banks, trust compa-
nies or such other financial institutions as may be designated by a Cabinet Order to
engage in any business below specified" (reflecting exceptions for various options and
futures products):
(1)to buy and sell securities or trade in futures of securities index, etc., securi-
ties options, or securities futures of foreign markets,
(2)to act as broker, agent or proxy with respect to buying and selling of securi-
ties or trading in securities options or securities futures of foreign markets,
(3)to act as broker, agent or proxy with respect to orders for trades below
specified:
a)buying or selling of securities, or trading in futures of securities index,
etc., or securities options, or
b)buying or selling of securities, or trading in securities futures of for-
1993]
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cludes banks and other financial institutions from engaging in
"securities business," including dealing, underwriting, and bro-
kerage of securities other than government and public entity
bonds, and related derivative securities.3" Together with Article
43 of the Securities and Exchange Law, which prohibits securi-
ties companies from engaging business other than securities bus-
iness without MOF approval, and Article 10 of the Banking Law,
which restricts banks from engaging in any businesses other
than banking and businesses auxiliary to banking,3 4 Article 65
creates a division between securities and banking business simi-
lar to that created by Glass-Steagall.
eign markets on foreign securities markets...
(4)to underwrite securities,
(5)to sell securities through public offering, or
(6)to handle the issuance or sale of securities through public offering.
Licenses to conduct securities business may be granted under any of four headings:
dealer business, broker business, underwriting business and selling business, i.e., han-
dling the issuance or sale of securities in public offerings without underwriting the secur-
ities involved. SEL, art. 28, 1 2.
33. SEL, supra note 32. Article 65 provides that:
No bank, trust company and such other financial institutions as may be
prescribed by an ordinance of the Ministry of Finance shall do as its business
any of the acts set forth in the items of Paragraph 8 of Article 2 [i.e., securities
business, as defined]; Provided, That this shall not apply to cases where any
bank buys or sells securities or effects securities index futures trading, securi-
ties options trading or foreign market's securities futures trading pursuant to a
written order received from its customer for the account of such customer or
where any bank, trust company or such other financial institutions as may be
prescribed by a Cabinet Order buys or sells securities or effects securities index
futures trading, securities options trading or foreign market's securities futures
trading for the purpose of investment or pursuant to a trust agreement signed
with its customers and for the account of such customers in accordance with
the provisions of other laws.
SEL, supra note 32.
Paragraph 2 of Article 65 exempts from the scope of its prohibition banks' under-
writing, dealing and other securities activities (other than brokerage) in national and
local government securities (including government-guaranteed securities), and dealing
and brokerage activity in futures and options products relating to government securities.
34. Banking Law, Law No. 59 of 1981, translated in 6 LAW BULL. SERIES (EHS),
BA1, 5-6 (1987). Article 10 of the Banking Law provides that banks may engage in (i)
accepting deposits, (ii) lending funds or discounting bills, drafts or notes, and (iii) effect-
ing transactions in exchange and money orders. Article 10-2 of the Banking Law permits
banks to engage in certain specifically enumerated activities, such as acting as surety,
buying securities for investment or the account of customers, etc. and other businesses
"incidental" to the banking business. Article 12 of the Banking Law restricts banks from
engaging in businesses other than as permitted by Articles 10 and 11, the Secured Bond
Trust Law, and other laws. Insurance companies are similarly restricted to the insurance
business by Article 5 of the Insurance Business Law, Law No. 41 of 1939, translated in 6
LAW BULL. SERIES, (EHS), FA1, 2 (1984).
JAPAN'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM
While the policy basis for Glass-Steagall is prudential - to
protect depositors' assets against the risks believed to be inher-
ent in bank securities ownership and trading activities - the
original policy basis for Article 65 appears to have been as much
political as prudential - to restrain Japanese banks from exert-
ing hegemony over the financial system as a whole, and as a co-
rollary, to help develop independent securities markets.
Whatever the original policy purposes, however, they were pur-
poses of the Occupation, not the Japanese legislature, and in
this sense Article 65 fulfills no domestic policy purpose at all. By
its endurance, however, Article 65 has become an accepted fea-
ture of the Japanese financial system, and, by conferring on the
MOF another means of maintaining the segmented and special-
ized financial system of post-war Japan it has come to serve a
quite different policy purpose than that originally intended.
These differences in policy basis, as well as cultural and histori-
cal factors, are reflected in the various differences between Arti-
cle 65 and Glass-Steagall.
1. Purposes of Article 65
Article 65 was proposed by Occupation authorities for the
first time in mid-1947, after the Diet had already passed a
United States-modeled Securities and Exchange Law,35 and was
approved as part of the completely revised Securities and Ex-
change Law of 1948.36 As explained by General Headquarters for
the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in its official
statement, Article 65 was intended to protect depositors from
banks' securities activities, since underwriting of securities was
inherently a dangerous business for trust institutions.3 7 Given
the Occupation authorities' general belief that what was good for
America was also good for Japan, this may be all that Article 65
was intended to achieve. 8 But this seems doubtful. Given Ja-
35. YASUJI ABE, GINKa SHAKEN KAKiNE RONS0 OBOEGAKI 31, 58 (1980). The only
provision of the 1947 law to enter into force was that which created an independent
securities and exchange commission based on the U.S. model. Id.
36. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 24, at 52. Both Yasuji Abe, then a director of
Yamaichi Securities, and T.F.M. Adams mention the personal role that the new chief of
the Securities Section played in developing the provision. Abe identifies the new section
chief as Adams (no first name given), although Adams refers only to "the official in
SCAP in charge of the matter." ABE, supra note 35, at 58-59; ADAMS & HoSHII, supra
note 24, at 52.
37. THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 39.
38. See, e.g., TsUTSUI, supra note 8, at 121, 123 (Occupation reform proposals in
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pan's undeveloped securities markets at that time, the actual
risk of harm to depositors through bank securities activity would
have been virtually nonexistent, and Article 65's prudential pur-
pose would have been meaningless.
Article 65's more basic purpose seems to have been to re-
strict bank activity over non bank sectors of the financial sys-
tem"9 and so to encourage the development of an independent
long-term financial market, which the Occupation planners
strongly favored.40 Article 65 may also have served a tactical
purpose in the struggle within SCAP at the time it was adopted
over the issue of bank deconcentration. The Finance Division,
deeply concerned about the impact of such deconcentrations on
the financial system, strongly opposed proposals by the Anti-
trust Division to break up Japan's larger banks into regional
units.41 It instead proposed less radical reforms to destroy "mo-
nopolistic positions" by the banks, including prohibitions
against bank affiliations with securities firms,42 and Article 65
was such a measure. The surprisingly muted response of the
Japanese banks to Article 65 suggests that they understood it as
an alternative to deconcentration, and by far the lesser of two
evils.43 The Finance Division's lobbying efforts against bank
finance were directed only to superficial institutional changes, based on an ethnocentric
vision of an "Americanized" Japan).
39. TsuTsui, supra note 8, at 68-69 (Finance Division of SCAP sought to increase
competition within the existing banking system, "primarily by promoting non-zaibatsu
institutions to challenge the financial superiority of the largest banks"); Rosenbluth,
supra note 11, at 67 (banks' grip on finance seen by Occupation authorities as anti-
competitive, to the detriment of both corporations and depositors).
40. See ADAMS & HOSHH, supra note 24, at 52 (by disassociating underwriting from
banking, and making it the exclusive province of securities companies, "the basic distinc-
tion between long- and short-term financing was institutionalized"); TsUTSUl, supra note
8, at 102-03, 107 n.66 (hopes of Joseph Dodge, United States financial emissary to Japan
and architect of the "Dodge Line," for independent securities markets for long-term
capital).
41. In 1947, the Antitrust Division proposed the break-up of Yasuda Bank into
three regional banks, and in early 1948 supported a much broader proposal to divide all
national banks into small units, each to operate within a single region, of which there
would be three to eight - an attempt in effect to replicate the local bank system of the
United States, which Antitrust Division believed would tend to promote democratic val-
ues and prevent the resurgence of a militaristic financial complex. TSUTSUI, supra note 8,
at 53, 57.
42. TsuTsui, supra note 8, at 76, 80 (citing Finance Division memo dated March 8,
1948). Such prohibitions against bank affiliation with securities firms were never
adopted.
43. ABE, supra note 35, at 58-59; TsuTsui, supra note 8, at 33. The bank most
closely connected with securities underwriting, the government-owned Industrial Bank of
Japan, was particularly silent; it may have been aware that the Occupation intended not
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deconcentration were successful. While large banks were initially
to have been broken up under the Corporation Deconcentration
Act of December 1947, banks were exempted from the law in
July 1948.44 This view of Article 65 is also shared by Japanese
securities law scholars, who tend to interpret it primarily as a
restriction on bank influence on the economy, and so to promote
securities markets, with protection of depositors only an ancil-
lary purpose.45
Whatever its original purpose, Article 65 has proved a use-
ful regulatory device to the MOF in promoting the segmented
and specialized financial system characteristic of post-war Ja-
pan.46 The "Big Four" securities firms, which grew up under the
shelter of Article 65, agreed to MOF control over the securities
only to break it up, but to disband it entirely. ABE, supra note 35, at 59; TSUTSUI, supra
note 8, at 33. Acceptance of Article 65, while an important restriction, was a feasible
alternative for the banks since their securities activities had in practice been limited to
underwriting. In this sense, Article 65 reflected an informal division between banking
and securities activities that had existed before the war. THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYS-
TEM, supra note 13, at 39.
44. Rosenbluth, supra note 11, at 83.
45. KATSURo KANZARI, SICKEN TORIHIKI H05 (SHIMIPAN) 401 (1987) (purposes of Arti-
cle 65 are to prevent excessive bank control over the economy, while at the same time
protecting depositors' assets); T. SUZUKI & I. KAWAMOTO, SIOKEN TORIHIKI H-
(SHIMPAN) 261 (1984) (primary purpose is to provide foundation for full development of
securities industry; ancillary purpose of depositor protection is evidenced by failure of
Article 65 to restrict bank ownership of securities); Katsur5 Kanzaki, Sh'oken Gy'omu to
Gink5 Gymu in K. KANZAKI & M. TATSUTA, SHOKEN TORIHIKI Ho- TAIKEI 389 (1986)
(noting both purposes); Tatsuta, Kiny7 Seiar5 Kaikaku to Kyos5 Seisaku: Gink5 no
Sanny'l to Shaoken Shi6, 74 SHIHON SHIJ 5, 7-8 (1991) (a major purpose is to prevent
the danger of a vicious cycle of feebly functioning capital market functions and increas-
ing dependence on bank finance by nurturing active capital markets); SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18 (basic principles underlying Arti-
cle 65 are the prevention of conflict of interest, avoidance of banks' dominating the mar-
ket and exercising influence over companies, and securing of sound bank management).
The protective purpose of Article 65 is emphasized, naturally, by the securities industry
and not the banking industry, which cites only the purposes of avoiding conflicts of in-
terest and threats to sound bank management. FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNciL FI-
NAL REPORT ON A NEW JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 26 (Federation of Bankers Ass'n of
Japan Trans., 1991) [hereinafter FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL FINAL REPORT].
46. This is in sharp contrast to the Antimonopoly Law, which from the outset was
totally inconsistent with the policies of the MITI to develop orderly exports and to avoid
excessive internal competition in rebuilding the nation's infrastructure. Given Japan's
long history of government-sanctioned or government-required cartels, hardly any law
could have been less attuned to Japan's economic traditions, and the law began to be
amended almost immediately upon its enactment. See Yoshio Kanazawa, The Regula-
tion of Corporate Enterprise: The Law of Unfair Competition and the Control of Mo-
nopoly Power, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SocmrY 480, 484-90
(Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1962); see generally ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JA-
PAN (1970).
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markets in return for MOF's protection against incursion by the
banks and MOF's assurance of continued high, fixed brokerage
commissions. Meanwhile, the MOF has been able to use conces-
sions on the scope of Article 65-permitted activities as a bargain-
ing chip in dealing with the banks,4 7 while Article 65's Occupa-
tion pedigree has permitted it to withstand political pressure
from the banks as long as Glass-Steagall held up in the United
States.48 Altogether, the MOF has been able to adopt Article 65
to policy purposes. of its own, which may explain its endurance.
2. Article 65 and Glass-Steagall
There are several significant differences between Article 65
and Glass-Steagall, and these differences have generally permit-
ted banks in Japan greater latitude in securities activities than
banks in the United States. While United States Glass-Steagall
distinctions have generally been made on the basis of activities
- with underwriting most strongly prohibited, while brokerage
is not - distinctions in Japan have tended to be drawn along
product lines, with considerable bank involvement with debt se-
curities and minimal bank involvement with equity securities,
other than equity ownership.
A fundamental difference is that Article 65 permits Japa-
nese banks to purchase, sell, and own securities for their own
investment purposes,49 while Glass-Steagall restricts banks' se-
curities purchases for their own account to limited types and
amounts of debt securities, thus preventing bank ownership of
equity securities altogether.50 The only restriction on Japanese
47. In the bank discussions underlying the revision to Article 65 in 1981, the MOF
sought to offer expanded bank powers to underwrite and sell government bonds as a
bargaining chip to obtain greater reporting compliance from the banks. That effort, how-
ever, failed. See Rosenbluth, supra note 11.
48. See Rosenbluth, supra note 11, at 67.
49. Article 65 provides in relevant part that no bank, trust company or other desig-
nated financial institution may engage in securities business, "[p]rovided, that this shall
not apply to cases where any bank. . . buys or sells securities or effects securities index
futures trading, securities options trading or foreign market's securities futures trading
for the purpose of investment . . . ." (emphasis added).
50. Section 16 of Glass-Steagall permits a bank to "purchase for its own account
investment securities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the
Currency may by regulation prescribe," 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added),
but equity securities are not included in the Comptroller's definitions of "investment
security," 12 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1992). This is a difference in regulatory interpretation of what
constitutes "investment securities," since both statutes permit purchases of investment
securities for banks' own accounts.
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bank securities ownership is provided by the Antimonopoly Law,
which prevents banks from purchasing more than five percent of
a company's stock without prior approval of the Fair Trade
Commission. 51 Accordingly, Japanese -banks may have, and do
have, large securities portfolios with five-percent-or-less stakes
in many Japanese corporations.2 Therefore, Article 65, as inter-
preted, attributes to bank ownership of securities a far lower
risk to bank depositors than does Glass-Steagall. In fact, some
Japanese securities scholars conclude that this difference itself
demonstrates that protection of bank depositors is only an ancil-
lary purpose of Article 65, while its main purpose is to encourage
the development of securities markets through the protection of
securities firms.5
Second, Article 65 does not restrict Japanese banks from af-
filiating with securities firms, and in fact through a combination
of five-percent-or-less shareholdings with other contractual ar-
rangements, all major Japanese banks have close affiliations with
securities firms.54 Glass-Steagall, in contrast, on its face prohib-
51. Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving
Fair Trade, Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 11, para. 1 (as amended), reprinted in Law Relating
to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade of Japan, 2
LAw BULL. SERIES JAPAN (EHS) KAI, 15 (1987) [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law]. The
limit applicable to insurance companies is 10%. The Fair Trade Commission generally
limits its exemptions to the 5% limit to cases where a bank seeks to engage, through a
subsidiary, in an approved business related to banking, and where the subsidiary will act
as agent of the parent bank or perform services related to the bank's core business for
the benefit of the bank itself (managing back-office services, employee facilities, commer-
cial property owned by the bank, etc.). Ichiro Kawamoto, Legal Problems Involved in
the Report of the Fundamental Research Committee of the Securities and Exchange
Council, CAMRI REv., Aug. 31, 1992, at 10, 15. Activities such as management consult-
ing, leasing, venture capital business, mortgage lending, and dealing in mortgage-backed
certificates, credit cards, factored receivables, etc., have been restricted to the 5% limit
as well. Id.
52. As of 1989, one of the top three shareholders in all 1,888 companies listed on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange was a bank, and banks collectively owned 20.5% of all issued and
outstanding shares of all such listed companies. SHOKEN DANTAI KYlOGIKAI, KINVU SEIDli
KAIKAKU RONGI NO MONDAI TEN 25 (1989).
53. See, e.g., Suzua & KAWAMOTO, supra note 45, at 261. United States law also
strictly restricts the ownership of bank securities by commercial companies, while no
such restriction applies in Japan. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-1850 (1988).
54. Banks participate in the management of these firms, appointing top officers of
the securities firms from among the bank's officers, transferring their own employees to
securities firms for training, directing brokerage orders through such firms or extending
securities services to bank clients. Mitsubishi Bank, Dai-Ichi'Kangyli Bank and
Sumitomo Bank, for example, have affiliate relationships with second-tier firms Ryoko
Securities, NKK, and Meiko Securities, respectively, while The Industrial Bank of Japan
is affiliated with New Japan Securities, Wako Securities and Okasan Securities. See, e.g.,
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its any affiliation between banks and organizations "engaged
principally" in the underwriting or distribution of securities, al-
though the impact of this restriction has been reduced in recent
years.5 5 Since Glass-Steagall restricts affiliations with underwrit-
ers and distributors of securities, United States banks are per-
mitted to engage in brokerage activities in any type of security,
either directly or through subsidiaries. 56 In Japan on the other
hand equity brokerage is considered the most sensitive of securi-
ties activities proscribed by Article 65.
Third, under the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law,
the term "securities" is narrowly defined by reference to a spe-
cific list of bonds, stock shares, and various trust certificates.5 7
This means that products similar to "securities," but not liter-
ally defined as such, may not be traded as securities or handled
by securities firms without special permission from the MOF. By
contrast, if such products are not classified as "securities," they
ViNER, supra note 6, at 34-38.
55. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378 (1988). The Federal Reserve Board currently considers
that an affiliate is not "principally engaged" in securities activities as long as less than
10% of its revenues are generated by prohibited securities activities. At the same time,
the Federal Reserve Board permits Glass-Steagall permissible securities activities (such
as government bond trading) to be counted as permissible activities (against which the
10% of revenues may bb measured) without considering the affiliate as being "principally
engaged" in securities activities. The biggest U.S. banks are, therefore, able to generate
sizeable revenues in otherwise prohibited areas such as equity underwriting through affil-
iated entities.
56. Retail brokerage activities of banks acting on behalf of customers have tradition-
ally been permitted on a limited basis, and have been reaffirmed as permissible activities
for bank subsidiaries without triggering the "affiliation" prohibitions of section 20. Se-
curities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984)
(upholding acquisition of discount broker Charles Schwab & Co. by BankAmerica
Corporation).
57. SEL, supra note 32, art. 2, defines securities as:
(1) Government securities, (2) municipal bonds, (3) debt securities issued
under special enabling laws by juridical persons, (4) secured corporate bonds or
unsecured corporate debenture bonds, (5) equity investment certificates issued
by juridical persons under special enabling laws, (6) share certificates . . . or
certificates representing the right to subscribe to new shares, (7) beneficiary
certificates of securities investment trusts or loan trusts, (8) securities or certif-
icates issued by foreign countries or foreign juridical persons which are of the
same nature as the securities or certificates referred to in the foregoing items,
and (9) such other securities or certificates as may be prescribed by a Cabinet
Order.
SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 2 (Capital Markets Res. Inst. trans. 1988). Although item
(9) would leave open room for an expansive definition of "securities," no new securities
have been identified under this provision. Hideki Kanda, Politics, Formalism, and the
Elusive Goal of Investor Protection: Regulation of Structured Investment Funds in Ja-
pan, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 569, 573 (1992).
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may be dealt in without constituting securities business for pur-
poses of Article 65 and so may be handled by banks.58 This cate-
gorization has permitted Japanese banks, through successful
lobbying efforts with the MOF, to deal in a number of products,
such as commercial paper and various securitized products, on
the basis that they are not "securities" for Japanese law pur-
poses, even though they would be in the United States. 59 This
categorization has also permitted the MOF to exert regulatory
authority over the securities and banking industries by permit-
ting (or not permitting) certain products to be handled by each
of them. In the United States, by contrast, the Supreme Court
has construed "securities" to be "sufficiently broad to encom-
pass virtually any investment that might be sold as an invest-
ment," 0 either because the product in question constitutes in
substance an investment contract,61 or because such product
bears a sufficiently strong "family resemblance" to securities
specifically enumerated in the Securities Act of 1933.62
Fourth, while Article 65 parallels Glass-Steagall in permit-
ting banks to underwrite and deal in government bonds and
public entity bonds,63 the fact that government bonds occupy
58. Securities firms must obtain the permission of the MOF to be engaged in any
business other than the "securities business," which includes handling any products
other than "securities." SEL, supra note 32, art. 43.
59. Commercial paper was classified in 1987 as a promissory note, and not a "secur-
ity," allowing both banks and securities firms (with permission from the Minister of Fi-
nance) to handle the product. Before this, the banking industry had stonewalled the
introduction of a commercial paper market in Japan for several years. See David G. Litt,
et al., Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry Into Commercial Pa-
per Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 369, 419 (1990).
The banking industry also succeeded in avoiding "securities" classification for residential
mortgage trust certificates and securitized bank loans, and, in addition, were able to
block the securities industry from obtaining permission to deal in them. See Kanda,
supra note 57, at 575.
60. Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60 (1990).
61. SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946).
62. Reeves, 494 U.S. at 56. This does not mean that regulatory authorities in the
United States have not sought to encourage their own regulated parties from engaging in
new activities on the basis of product classification, since the Federal Reserve Board
initially took the position in Bankers Trust that commercial paper was not a "security"
and could be handled by Bankers Trust on that basis. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers Trust 1), 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
63. Administrative guidance limited the banks' underwriting of such securities to
national government securities during the high growth period, THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 39, but beginning in the late 1970s the banks fought for ex-
panded roles in underwriting, dealing and retail selling of government and other public
entity bonds. Retail sales and dealing in government bonds were permitted by amend-
ments to Article 65 enacted in 1981, while sales and dealing in index futures, options and
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the overwhelming portion of the total bond market in Japan
means that Japanese banks are more important players in the
Japanese bond market than United States banks have been
here." In addition, for such relatively limited corporate bond
financings as there are, the long-term credit banks and leading
city banks act as commissioned companies, or quasi-trustees, for
corporate bond issuers, and are involved in bond syndicates
which set the offering timetables for such issues.65 Japanese
banks under Article 65 have also been able to act as agents in
private placements of securities, 8 and to conduct securities ac-
tivities outside Japan (through subsidiaries), although the MOF
has restricted such activities through administrative guidance.6 7
foreign market securities futures trading were permitted by amendments in 1985. See
Rosenbluth, supra note 11, at 68.
64. In 1988 government bond trading accounted for approximately 90% of all bond
trading in Japan. By contrast, in 1986 corporate bond issuances (excluding Nippon Tele-
phone and Telegraph, a quasi-governmental issuer) accounted for only 0.5% of all do-
mestic bonds issued. TATEWAKI, supra note 17, at 83, 86-87. As recently as March 1992,
only 57 of Japan's 2,500 publicly listed companies had any domestic corporate bonds
outstanding, while in the U.S., regular corporate bonds account for 31% of U.S. corpo-
rate debt. Quentin Hardy, Japanese Companies Need to Raise Cash, But First a Bond
Market Must Be Built, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1992, at C1. Banks are heavily involved in
the government bond markets. As of June, 1990, 680 banks and other non-securities
firms (including 39 insurance companies) had licenses to make retail sales of public
bonds, 219 banks and other firms had dealing licenses, and 83 banks and other firms had
commissions brokerage (toritsugi) licenses for futures transactions. Tatsuta, supra note
45, at 5, 7 n.2.
65. As a commissioned company (jutaku gaisha), the bank acts as a sort of financial
advisor to the bond issuer while undertaking certain statutory and contractual obliga-
tions as a trustee on behalf of the bondholders. Osamu Kamihara, Recent Developments
in the Securities and Exchange Law of Japan, in JAPANESE BANKING, SECURITIES AND
ANTI-MONoFOLY LAW (Hiroshi Oda & R. Geoffrey Grice eds., 1988). Article 45 of the
Securities and Exchange Law prevents securities companies from undertaking such roles
for publicly offered issues.
66. The private placement market in Japan has grown from 166 offerings (Y39.1
billion) in fiscal 1985 to 734 offerings (Y417.7 billion) in the first nine months of fiscal
year 1991, or Y557 billion on an annualized basis. The attraction for the banks is the
variety of fees they may charge (arrangers' fees, placement agents' fees, registration
agents' fees, payment agents' fees, etc.), up to 10% of the issue offering prices. SHIZKEN
DANTAi KYVGIKAI, SEIDO KAIKAKU RONGI E NO GIMON 27-28 (1991). Private placement
activities for U.S. banks were validated by Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (validating bank private place-
ment activities on an agency basis, so long as no prohibited underwriting activities are
implicated).
67. The "three bureaus guidance" (sankyoku shido-) among the Banking, Securities
and International Finance Bureaus of the MOF has restricted the ability of Japanese
banks to establish overseas subsidiaries and to act as lead managers in securities offer-
ings in the Euromarkets. Masabumi Yamane, Financial Transactions in Japanese Law,
in ODA & GRICE, supra note 65, at 6, 21. Under the regulations to the Financial System
1993) JAPAN'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Despite the scope of these activities, Article 65 has kept the
banks out of various potentially lucrative securities activities, in-
cluding retail brokerage and equity underwriting.6 " This has
kept the banks lobbying for expanded securities powers in a
back-and-forth struggle with securities companies seeking ex-
panded bank powers. In 1981, the banks won a major struggle to
deal in and make retail sales of government bonds.69 At about
the same time, however, securities companies were given the
right to market interest-bearing, medium-term government bond
funds to the public at a higher interest rate than available
through the banks, and to make loans to customers on the col-
lateral of public bonds.70 Since "securities" are narrowly defined,
each new financial product sought to be introduced, and each
proposed entry into a new field of business, may raise Article 65
issues, requiring examination by the Securities and the Banking
Bureaus of the MOF and turf allocations between the securities
and banking industries.7 1 While this examination process may be
useful to the MOF in various ways,72 the piecemeal approach to
dismantling Article 65 has become increasingly time-consuming.
At the same time, the need to maintain the specialized financial
Reform Law announced in December 1992, the "three bureaus guidance" is to be abol-
ished (haishi) (subject, however, to a gradual five year phase out period). Press Release,
on "Concerning an Outline of Implementation of the Financial System Reform,"
Okurashll, Dec. 17, 1992, item 5.1 [hereinafter Press Release].
68. The Antimonopoly Law in Japan prevents banks from acquiring a brokerage
business as a wholly owned subsidiary, although, as stated supra note 54, many banks
have close ties to brokerage firms. Until the stock market declines of the last few years,
brokerage commissions in Japan (still fixed-basis only) have been extremely lucrative.
VINER, supra note 6, at 76-78.
69. See Rosenbluth, supra note 11.
70. See generally THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 262-63.
71. Struggles over retail sales of government bonds and sales of commercial paper
are described in Rosenbluth, supra note 11, and Litt et al., supra note 59, respectively.
See also VINER, supra note 6, at 29-34. Banks were allowed in 1989 to trade bond futures
on behalf of their customers, Japan Set to Nix Investment Banking Barriers, CoRPo-
RATE FINANCING WEEK, July 10, 1989, at 1, while securities firms were permitted in 1990
to offer a variety of new foreign exchange-related products (reserved to banks) and se-
curities products that combined commodity and currency futures with real estate, stocks
and bonds. Kyle Pendragon, Japanese Banks Flourish Under Article 65 Rules, FUTuREs:
THE MAGAZINE OF COMMODrrMs & OPTIONS, Aug. 1990, at 53.
72. The need for institutions to obtain MOF's approval before embarking in a new
direction obviously reinforces and enhances MOF's control over the activities of those
firms, while at the same time permitting MOF to assess the implications the new product
may have for the Japanese markets before the product is introduced. Also MOF may use
the carrot of expanded securities or bank powers, or characterization of a new product as
a "security" or not, in order to obtain concessions from the banking or the securities
industry.
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system has decreased. These shifts have therefore laid the
groundwork for the recent changes to Article 65 embodied in the
Law.
B. The Financial System Reform Law of 1992
1. The Advisory Council Reports
In the 1980s, recognizing the big-picture issues posed by the
changes in the world-wide financial system and increasingly dis-
satisfied with a piece meal approach to resolving Article 65 is-
sues, the MOF requested two of its advisory councils,7 the Fi-
nancial System Research Council and the Securities and
Exchange Council, to address the issue of overall structural re-
form of the Japanese financial system, including Article 65.74
While these councils are not industry trade groups, and while
members of the banking and securities industries sit on each
council, the two councils represent to a considerable extent the
views of the banking and the securities industries, respectively.
These councils published a series of reports beginning in Decem-
ber 1987, and ending with the publication of final reports of
both councils in June 1991. 75 These final reports, in principle,
provided the basis for the MOF's draft of the Financial System
Reform Law."
73. Advisory councils, or shingikal (literally, "deliberation councils"), are standing
or ad hoc committees attached to Japanese ministries whose purpose is to investigate, to
debate and to advise the ministry on whatever issues may be referred to it. Composed of
"persons of learning and experience," advisory councils are to represent a cross-section
of interests, drawing on academics, industry leaders, journalists and members of other
constituencies that could be affected by the measures to be considered; however, the
councils tend to become bargaining grounds between the government and the industries
concerned. The councils' reports in principle form the basis for legislation ultimately
proposed to the Diet by the government. See Yung Ho Park, Governmental Advisory
Commission System in Japan, 3 J. Comp. ADMIN. 435 (1972).
74. The Financial System Research Council (Kinyui Seido Ch-osakai) is designed to
address issues affecting the financial system in the broadest sense, but the interests of
the banks are heavily represented. The Securities and Exchange Council (Shuken
Torihiki Shingikai) is directly attached to the Securities Bureau and tends to reflect
securities industry interests.
75. FINANCxAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCI FINAL REPORT, supra note 45; SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COUNCm FINAL REPORT, supra note 23. For a thorough discussion of these
reports, see David G. Litt, Work in Progress at the Ministry of Finance: Proposals for
Restructuring the Japanese Financial Services Industry, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 711
(1991); Royama, supra note 4.
76. The process of long deliberations of the advisory councils, behind-the-scenes
maneuvering, and step-by-step pre-compromises by industry groups and the government
is characteristic of Japanese political decision-making. While this may appear from the
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The advisory councils were asked to decide (among other
issues) which of the following five different bases of bank securi-
ties business would be optimal for Japan: integration of activi-
ties through an ad hoc, piecemeal approach; operation of securi-
ties activities through a specialized subsidiary; operation of
securities activities through a subsidiary which itself would be
multi-functional (combining for example trust banking and se-
curities activities); concurrent operation of securities activities
within the bank, or true universal banking; and -operation of
banking and securities activities through an ultimate parent
holding company structure, as under the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act in the United States. 7
The piecemeal approach was rejected on several bases: first,
that it would not permit a coherent system of mutual entry into
banking and securities businesses; second, that it would not lead
to an internationally "acceptable" system; and, finally, that it
failed to incorporate sufficiently the users' point of view.7" The
holding company structure, while recognized to have various ad-
vantages,7 9 was rejected as inconsistent with Article 9 of Japan's
Antimonopoly Law, which flatly prohibits all holding companies
unless the approval of the Fair Trade Commission is obtained.80
In their final reports, both councils rejected universal bank-
ing."' Among the problems cited at various stages of the report-
ing process were: (1) the threat of conflicts of interest; 2 (2) the
outside to reflect a cultural desire to reach harmonious compromise, each industry group
jockeys to protect its self-interest, while the government seeks to preserve its administra-
tive authority and to promote its separate agenda as best it can. Even the compromise
process is often not complete: in the case of the Financial System Reform Law, many
issues were left unresolved. See Litt, supra note 75, at 753.
77. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
78. SECOND FINANCIAL SYSTEM COMMITTEE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ON A NEW JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (INTERIM REPORT) (Federation of Bank-
ers Ass'n of Japan trans., 1989) [hereinafter FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL IN-
TERim REPORT]; FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNcI FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at
20.
79. The holding company approach was recognized to provide a certain degree of
protection against conflict of interest problems, FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 78, at 42; SEcuRrrIES AND EXCHANGE COUNcIL FINAL REPORT,
supra note 23, at 15.
80. Antimonopoly Law, supra note 51, art. 9. Japan is virtually unique in maintain-
ing such a flat ban on holding companies. The prohibition is sensitive because it was a
cornerstone of Occupation efforts to prevent the recreation of the zaibatsu, which oper-
ated through classic holding company structures.
81. FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNciL FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 21; SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 15, 17.
82. FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 40-42;
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inability of management of universal banks to provide indepen-
dent and sound management as a securities company and so
contribute to the development of the capital markets;8 3 (3) con-
cerns that universal banks could dominate their customers and
smaller competition;8 4 (4) the unfair access that banks would
have to funding from the Bank of Japan and to insured depos-
its; 5 and, (5) concerns over the unfair use of inside informa-
tion.8 The securities and banking industries took different posi-
tions, however, about whether these problems are transitional or
fundamental. The Financial System Research Council hedged its
bets by stating that the universal banking system "has many
problems at this point in terms of maintaining sound banking
management and preventing harmful conflicts of interest," and
by noting that debt private placements and underwriting, deal-
ing, etc., of public bonds were already being conducted at the
bank entity level.87 By implication, the banks suggest these is-
sues can be solved through regulatory means in the future. The
Securities and Exchange Council, on the other hand, has empha-
sized that Article 65 has the additional purpose of avoiding
banks' dominance of the markets, and that this will not simply
be a transitional problem. 88
The remaining areas of focus were single-purpose and
multi-functional subsidiaries. Multi-functional subsidiaries
would be able to operate in a variety of areas presently required
to be conducted by discrete entities, such as securities business
and trust banking business, while single-purpose subsidiaries
would be able to operate in only one area. Even in the multi-
functional subsidiary case, however, deposit-taking functions
were proposed to be isolated from non-banking business activi-
ties, and/or the subsidiary was to perform only wholesale busi-
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 15. 1
83. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 15.
84. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 15.
85. FINANCIAL SYsTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 78, at 40. The
text does not list problems noted in the order raised in the report.
86. FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 78, at 40.
87. FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 21 (em-
phasis added). Although the banks had initially called for adoption of universal banking,
Linda Sieg, Japan Banks Step Up Push for Universal Banking, Reuters, Dec. 14, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File, by the time of its interim report the
Financial System Research Council already was willing to agree that the "leap to univer-
sal banking in one bound may be too drastic," FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 78, at 38.
88. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 15, 18.
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ness activities, in order to protect the retail customer.8 9 To the
Securities and Exchange Council, the multi-functional subsidi-
ary approach seemed to represent a possible first step to univer-
sal banking, while the banks found only that multi-functional
subsidiaries deserved "further study."90 The approach finally
pr6posed was to require separate subsidiaries for each discrete
activity, for several reasons: (1) management of different risks
associated with different types of enterprises would be simpli-
fied; (2) disclosure would be promoted, and inside information
and other conflict of interest risks would be decreased; (3) ad-
justing for inequities in competitive conditions such as number
of branch office locations would be simplified; (4) competition
among types of business would be more focused and the benefits
of competition brought more quickly to consumers; and, (5) reg-
ulatory supervision would be simplified."1 Both councils agreed
that securities subsidiaries of banks should be excluded from the
stock brokerage business "for the time being." 2
2. The Law
The Financial System Reform Law (the Law), passed by the
Japanese Upper House on June 19, 1992, adopts the councils'
proposals for the separate subsidiary approach to mutual entry,
by permitting banks and securities firms to own majority-owned
subsidiaries in other fields.93 In a number of important respects,
the Law increases the scope of bank securities powers, even
without establishing a securities subsidiary. The Law removes
commercial paper and certain loan trusts from the scope of Arti-
89. FINANCIAL SYsTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 78, at 40.
90. FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 21.
91. FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 22-23.
92. SEcuRrrEs AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18; FINAN-
CIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 23. The reports of the
councils, which address in a cursory manner only those issues directly related to univer-
sal banking, raise a great many more issues than those cited in the text. By demonstrat-
ing the substantial agreement of the councils on the issue of separate subsidiaries, more-
over, the text suggests a greater degree of agreement than there actually was. See Litt,
supra note 75, for a thorough discussion of those reports.
93. Financial System Reform Law, supra note 5, arts. 43-2, 65-3. Presumably the
option of owning a less than wholly-owned subsidiary is intended to permit banks to
establish securities subsidiaries in conjunction with other shareholders, to avoid unneces-
sary expenditures. The opportunity for joint ownership suggests that a main bank's
keiretsu members may be potential partners approached, a pattern that will reinforce
keiretsu allegiances. Regulations announced so far, see note 109 infra, do not address
this. Alternatively, minority interests in subsidiaries could be spun off to the public.
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cle 65 prohibitions,94 and expressly authorizes banks to handle
private placement business in other securities.9 5 Private place-
ments are defined clearly for the first time," and the concept is
expanded to permit sales to an unlimited number of "qualified
institutional investors. ' 97 Furthermore, the Law fails to redefine
"securities" in a general way."8 This means that the MOF will
still be required to approve separately the "security" status of
each new product sought to be introduced in Japan, and that
the banks may continue to deal directly in products, including
securitized products, not specifically enumerated as securities.9
The Law itself specifies few "firewalls"' 100 between parent
and subsidiary institutions, although these were much discussed
94. Financial System Reform Law, supra note 5, art. 65, 1 2, items (2), (3).
95. Financial System Reform Law, supra note 5, art. 65, 1 2, item (4). Regulations
under Article 10 of the Banking Law will also be amended to clarify that handling of
privately placed securities is a permitted ancillary banking activity.
96. Financial System Reform Law, supra note 5, art. 2, 1 3.
97. All purchasers must be qualified institutional investors (tekikaku hikan t'Sshika)
and there must be very small risk that the securities may be transferred by public offer-
ing or to investors other than qualified institutional investors. Financial System Reform
Law, supra note 5, art. 2, 3, item (2).
98. Commercial paper and mortgage-backed trust certificates have been added to
the list, but lease-backed and other credit-backed securities were left out in deference to
the MITI under whose jurisdiction such instruments presently fall. Such instruments
will now have to be defined as securities in a separate "Law for the Regulation of Speci-
fied Claims." See What Happened to the Report of the Advisory Councils?, CAMRI
REV., Apr. 30, 1992, at 37. The Securities and Exchange Council had proposed a broad
definition of securities, as any certificate or instrument representing the status or right of
a party to a contract or arrangement with the characteristics that: (i) the investor con-
tributes funds which the recipient uses to run or manage a business, (ii) funds contrib-
uted be invested or managed by the party receiving them, (iii) the investor has the right
to receive distributions in accordance with the investment contract, and (iv) the inves-
tor's rights may be assigned. SEcuarrms AND EXCHANGE COUNciL FINAL REPORT, supra
note 23, at 4.
99. The securitized products area is very large, since Japanese banks shed about
Y2.3 trillion in loan assets in fiscal 1992 to comply with BIS standards. See What Hap-
pened to the Report of the Advisory Councils?, supra note 98, at 37; Securitization of
Loans Up Sharply, THE NjKKEi WEEKLY, Apr. 5, 1993, at 17. The failure to include
securitized products as securities means that disclosure rules will not apply to sales, and
that sales must be limited to large investors in private transactions, which will not pro-
mote transparency of the markets. Former Securities Bureau Chief Nobuhiko Matsuno,
Current Issues Facing the Securities Administration, CAMRI REV., Aug. 31, 1992, at 2,
4.
100. The "firewall" discussion in Japan has a different focus from that in the United
States, where the focus is on limiting bank financial liabilities to non-banking affiliates to
prevent drains on bank capital in times of financial crisis for the affiliates. In Japan the
focus of discussion is the need to maintain a competitive balance, or level playing field,
between securities and banking firms.
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by the Securities and Exchange Council.10 1 This is a victory for
the banks since firewalls implemented by regulation, or informal
administrative guidance, may much more easily be modified
than firewalls established by law. The Law itself states only
that: (1) affiliated banks and securities companies shall not have
common directors or statutory auditors;1°2 (2) securities firms
may not conclude contracts with customers if they know their
bank parent or subsidiary to have provided financing to the cus-
tomer conditioned on such customer's purchase of the securi-
ties;103 and, (3) transactions are prohibited if they are on terms
that are not arms length and if they would "threaten to injure
the fairness of trading."'10 Other prohibited acts are left to be
determined by ordinance. 0 5
One clear, if temporary, victory for the securities industry is
that bank securities subsidiaries are restricted by the Law from
conducting retail brokerage "for the time being," in order to
101. The Securities and Exchange Council stressed the particular ability of Japa-
nese banks to influence their corporate customers, and so obtain large numbers of issuers
as clients among their keiretsu members on this basis rather than on the basis of com-
petitive securities skills or pricing. To this end, the Council sought measures (i) to ensure
independence and soundness of management of new securities firms, by express alloca-
tions of risks between parent and subsidiary and by prohibiting excessive dependence by
subsidiaries on transactions with certain parties; (ii) to prevent conflicts of interest aris-
ing through underwritings of the bank parent's own securities or of issuers from which
the bank parent seeks to collect bad loans; (iii) to promote fair competition by restricting
subsidiaries' issuances of securities to investors on very favorable terms in return for
engaging in business with the subsidiary; (iv) to prevent bank parents from giving busi-
ness to their securities subsidiaries on concessionary terms, and to prevent bank parents
from purchasing securities underwritten by their subsidiaries within a stated time period
after issuance; (v) to prevent disclosure of non-public customer information by a bank
parent company to its subsidiary; and, (vi) to prevent interlocking directorships or joint
use of office space between a parent and a subsidiary. Furthermore, the Securities and
Exchange Council sought to have existing relationships between banks and their affili-
ated securities companies investigated and measures taken to prevent abuses. SEcurrImS
AND EXCHANGE COUNciL FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 17-18.
102. Financial System Reform Law, supra note 5, art. 42-2. This will not prevent
the transfer of directors or employees between companies as long as they give up their
positions at the first company for the duration of their stay at the subsidiary.
103. Financial System Reform Law, supra note 5, art. 50-2, item 2.
104. Financial System Reform Law, supra note 5, art. 50-2, item 1. Accordingly non-
arm's length transactions, in themselves, are not prohibited. Are transactions which
threaten to injure fair trading intended to be permitted so long as they are arms-length
transactions? Presumably examples of injuries to fair trading will be forthcoming in the
ordinance.
105. Financial System Reform Law, supra note 5, art. 50-2, item 3. Even acts pro-
hibited by the Law are subject to exception if the Minister of Finance finds them un-
likely to undermine the public interest or the protection of investors. Financial System
Reform Law, supra note 5, art. 50-2, item 3.
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avoid a disastrous competitive situation for the many financially
crippled third-tier securities firms whose brokerage revenues
have virtually dried up.106
The Law also takes several steps towards streamlining Ja-
pan's segmented financial system. Long-term credit banks and
the specialized foreign exchange bank (The Bank of Tokyo) are
permitted either to merge with, or to convert themselves into, a
financial institution of a different type, including an ordinary
bank.10 7 Although this leaves the timing of a conversion decision
with the banks in question, it is a move toward streamlining Ja-
pan's segmented market structure. The Law also abolishes alto-
gether the category of "mutual bank" (sugu ginku), through re-
peal of the Mutual Bank Law. 08
3. The Regulations
In December 1992, the MOF announced an outline of the
regulations to be implemented under the Law in April 1993.109
These regulations demonstrate how limited the initial impact of
the Law will be in liberalizing bank securities activities, since
they sharply limit both the scope of permitted securities activi-
ties and the number of banking institutions initially authorized
to engage in such activities at all.
Authorized securities subsidiaries will initially (meaning for
two or three years) be allowed only to underwrite public bonds,
106. Supplementary Provisions of the Law, supra note 5, art. 19. Over 200 so-called
third-tier brokerage houses in Japan are at present in serious financial trouble due to the
declines in the Japanese stock markets and the consequent collapse of trading volume.
The weakened condition of the financial system generally makes mergers, the traditional
recourse of the MOF, a difficult strategy to apply, and there is considerable concern
about a brokerage house collapse. VINER, supra note 6, at 29; Japan Finance Ministry
Considers Letting Foreign Banks Acquire Securities Firms, [Jan. - June] Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 25 at 1108 (June 22, 1992). Although banks will not be able to establish retail
brokerage operations through a securities subsidiary, the possibility is left open that ex-
isting retail brokers could maintain existing trading in debt securities if taken over by a
Japanese bank. The MOF has also expressed a receptive attitude towards the possibility
of foreign bank takeovers of Japanese brokerage houses, and has suggested that a foreign
bank may be able to retain equity retail brokerage licenses in such a case. Id.
107. The Law amends the Law Concerning Conversion or Merger of Financial Insti-
tutions, Articles 3, 4.
108. Law No. 199 of 1951. The former mutual (s-Ugil) banks had already converted
themselves into ordinary banks in the last few years. THE SECOND AssociArION OF RE-
GIONAL BANKS, THE NEW REGIONAL BANKS OF JAPAN 1991, at 1 (1991).
109. Press Release, supra note 67. See also MOP Determines Details of Financial
Deregulations, Japan Economic Newswire, Dec. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, OMNI File.
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nonconvertible corporate bonds, and certain equity-linked secur-
ities (convertible bonds, bonds with warrants and warrants), and
to act as broker or dealer for public bonds and nonconvertible
corporate bonds (but not equity-linked securities);110 they will
be expressly barred under the regulations from engaging in eq-
uity underwriting or trading."' This represents only a modest
advance over securities activities of banks currently permitted
under the present Article 65.
Furthermore, only long-term credit banks and trust banks
(ten in all), and central cooperative institutions (principally the
government-controlled Norinchukin Bank), will be eligible to en-
gage in such activities for an initial period of one year. Even
then, only those institutions which "place priority" on securities
activities will be eligible (implying that long-term credit banks
must choose either to establish securities subsidiaries or trust
bank subsidiaries). 2 The establishment of securities subsidiar-
ies will be further limited so as to avoid "confusion" in the mar-
ket that could be caused by excessive entry of new institutions
into the securities business at the same time (giving the MOF its
queuing powers over applications).113 As an overarching limita-
tion, all of such liberalizing steps are to be considered (and pre-
sumably are subject to reevaluation) in light of various factors
such as general conditions in the market, the reform measures'
influence on business operations, the condition of parent compa-
nies, the situation after implementation of the reforms, and
(hardly as a priority) the purpose of the reforms.11 4 The mini-
mum capital for securities companies which seek to act as man-
aging underwriters authorized to conduct negotiations with issu-
ers - and therefore authorized to discuss underwriting fees -
will be more than tripled from the present level of three billion
yen to ten billion yen. 1 5
110. Press Release, supra note 67, intro. para., item 1. Securities subsidiaries may
trade in the last-mentioned securities to the minimum extent necessary in connection
with their underwriting of such securities.
111. Trading and underwriting in stock index futures and options, and trading in
equity-linked securities, are expressly prohibited.
112. Press Release, supra note 67, item 3.1. Similarly, those securities companies,
long-term credit banks, specialized foreign exchange banks (i.e., The Bank of Tokyo) and
central cooperative credit institutions which place priority on trust bank activities are to
be permitted to establish trust bank subsidiaries.
113. Press Release, supra note 67, item 3.4.
114. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 67, items 3.2, 3.3, intro. para.
115. Press Release, supra note 67, item 3.5; Securities and Exchange Law Cabinet
Enforcement Order Article 15, item 1(1) (1991). It appears, although it is not clear, that
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The regulations also list a series of firewalls"n that will limit
the ability of banks' securities subsidiaries to take advantage of
their parents' banking relationships with customers. 1 7 A securi-
ties subsidiary may not lead-manage an issue if its parent bank
is the lead commissioned company for the issue (or if its parent
bank has acted as lead commissioned company in over half of
that issuer's offerings in the previous two years), unless the is-
suer has net assets in excess of 500 billion yen and is therefore
presumably not under the parent bank's control." 8 Joint visits
by securities subsidiaries and parent banks are prohibited, ex-
cept upon a customer's request."' Non-public information con-
cerning customers or issuers is not to be received or offered be-
tween parent banks and securities subsidiaries. 20 Securities
subsidiaries are to aim for a level of fifty percent permanent em-
ployees within a period of five years after establishment; execu-
tives with representation ,power of the securities subsidiary may
not become executives of the parent bank; and other executives
are not to become executives of the parent bank, nor work in its
securities department, for two years after leaving the securities
subsidiary. 2' Also, securities subsidiaries are not permitted to
have their head office in the same building as the main office of
their parent banks, nor may securities subsidiary branches, oper-
this Y10 billion level will apply to newly established securities companies only, and not
existing securities companies. The implications for foreign securities firms may'be signifi-
cant, since unless they are willing to commit such amounts of minimum capital they will
be unable to conduct underwriting fee negotiations. By limiting the number of entrants,
the securities market will therefore remain a fixed fee area, without a free market in
negotiated fees. This provision raises questions about the MOF's motives, especially if
existing firms are grandfathered while only new firms are required to meet this higher
threshold. Minimum bank capital meanwhile is to be raised to Y2 billion.
116. Literally, "measures for the prevention of harmful effects" (heigai b'oshi sochi).
These are principally directed not towards stemming capital flows between securities ac-
tivities and bank. activities, but toward preserving the competitive balance between the
industries as a political matter.
117. The regulations refer to "parent financial institutions," but the text will refer
to parent banks.
118. Press Release, supra note 67, item 1.2.1. This will permit a bank such as the
Industrial Bank of Japan to act as lead commissioned company, while its securities sub-
sidiary acts as lead manager, for bond issues of major Japanese corporations, regardless
of the parent bank's relationship with that corporation.
119. Press Release, supra note 67, item 1.2.2.
120. Again, unless written agreement of the customer is obtained. Press Release,
supra note 67, item 1.2.3. The specifics of what constitutes non-public information are to
be developed by the banking and securities self-regulatory institutions.
121. This rule is to be supplemented by self-regulatory measures. Press Release,
supra note 67, item 1.2.4.
JAPAN'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM
ations premises, computer facilities, dealing rooms, etc. be
shared with the parent bank.12
2
Other firewalls are more briefly listed, presumably to be de-
tailed further: (1) restrictions are to be placed on the ratio of
securities subsidiaries' revenues arising from transactions with
the parent bank; (2) lead underwriting by securities subsidiaries
of securities issued by their parent banks is to be restricted;
(3) if securities subsidiaries underwrite securities for borrowers
of their parent banks, they are required to disclose the possibil-
ity that funds so raised may be applied towards repayment of
loans by such issuers to the parent; (4) securities subsidiaries are
not to make tie-in sales with their parent banks; (5) securities
subsidiaries are not to make sales of securities if they are aware
that their parent bank has extended credit to customers to fi-
nance the purchase of such securities; (6) securities subsidiaries
are to apply arms-length rules to transactions with their parent
banks; and, (7) sales of securities underwritten by securities
subsidiaries to their parent banks will be restricted.123
4. Evaluation
As amplified by these regulations, the Law will have only
minimal impact on securities competition in Japan for at least
several years. This reflects in part MOF's judgment that Japan's
current financial instability makes virtually any new securities
activities too risky for the banks and too threatening for the se-
curities firms that would be required to compete with them.
However, it also reflects MOF's desire to orient the long-term
credit banks and trust banks in a new direction, while at the
same time promoting the development of a corporate bond
market.
By permitting the merger or conversion of the long-term
credit banks and The Bank of Tokyo into ordinary banks, the
Law signals that the original function of these specialized insti-
tutions is no longer needed. Indeed, their continued indepen-
dence is a drag on the development of the corporate bond mar-
ket, which they have steadfastly opposed since an open
corporate bond market would both undercut their special role of
122. Press Release, supra note 67, item 1.2.5.
123. Press Release, supra note 67, item 1.2.6. All of such measures will presumably
be clarified in the actual MOF regulations, or more likely, in subsidiary interpretive re-
leases, notifications, etc..
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supplying long-term funds and sharply reduce their fee income
as commissioned companies.12 4 The regulations will therefore
give the long-term credit banks and the trust banks a head start
in the securities business over competitor city banks (with their
much larger branch and deposit base). The downturn in the
equity markets, however, must be a sharp disappointment to
these banks, since wide equity underwriting spreads will not be
available during this head-start period.
The Law is also one step in a variety of measures being un-
dertaken to promote a domestic corporate bond market in Ja-
pan.125 Surprisingly, in view of the size of Japan's financial re-
sources, a corporate bond market has never fully developed in
Japan, partly as a reflection of the historical ability of the
zaibatsu banks to finance their group operations internally, but
also as a reflection of outright governmental restrictions on cor-
porate bond borrowings, to enhance control over the channeling
of funds to targeted sectors of the economy."' Since the long-
term credit banks and trust banks were established to perform
the long-term funding functions of an open corporate bond mar-
ket, these institutions became institutional barriers to that mar-
ket's development. Still another barrier has been the lack of a
124. Such fees have been more than ten times the fees for corresponding services in
the Euromarkets (e.g., Y53 million for a Y-10 billion bond issue versus an estimated Y3.5
million in the Euromarkets). Brian W. Semkow, Japan's 1992 'Big Bang' and Other Fi-
nancial Reform, 3 J. INT'L Bus. L. 89, 93 (1992). Such fees would drop dramatically if
Japan's corporate bond market were liberalized.
125. See FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 25-
26, for recommendations. The Ministry of Justice has completed a draft of revisions to
the Commercial Code to be submitted to the Diet currently in session. The revisions will
lift the current restrictions on corporate bond issuances, which limit unsecured bond
issuances to the amount of an issuer's net assets and limit secured bond issuances to
twice that amount (as reduced to give account to unsecured bond issuances). With ex-
ceptions for certain private placements, issuers will be required to appoint bond commis-
sioned companies in conjunction with their bond issues as an additional measure of in-
vestor protection (perhaps permitting a role for commercial banks not yet authorized to
underwrite the bonds). This will effect a significant change in the Japanese bond mar-
kets, and reflects a shift in attitude towards much greater reliance on securities disclos-
ure and bond rating systems, as well as the principle of investor responsibility. Corre-
spondence from Japanese attorneys (February 1993) (on file with author).
126. To exert control over the economy by rationing the supply of credit, the Japa-
nese military authorities in the 1930s and 1940s restricted the ability of corporations to
issue bonds directly, requiring corporations to rely entirely on the banks for their financ-
ing. TsuTsui, supra note 8, at 14. This pattern was continued after the war, when corpo-
rations were encouraged to turn to the long-term credit banks for long-term funds, with
very limited amounts of bonds being issued. Bonds which could be issued, moreover,
could only be issued on a secured basis, because of great losses in the late 1920s. THE
JAPANSES FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 43-44; TATEwAxI, supra note 17, at 83-85.
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bond rating system and procedures, although at least five rating
agencies now exist in Japan.127
A domestic bond market is now needed in Japan, since the
many Japanese companies that issued convertible and warrant
bonds in the Euromarkets in the 1980s (at very low interest
rates) find that as the maturities of these bonds become due, the
bonds cannot be converted into equity and must be refinanced
at much higher rates.128 The Law tends to promote this market
by opening debt securities underwriting to the long-term credit
banks and trust banks, which have a strong incentive to develop
these markets ahead of the city banks.
On many other issues, the Law will not have the impact it
was hoped to have as recently as last year. 29 The Law itself re-
flects the deadlock of the councils on a number of key issues,
and so left the status quo as it was or deferred issues for later
resolution by the MOF.R 1 0 In its announced implementation of
the Law, the MOF has used that deadlock, in Japan's current
unstable financial situation, as the basis for justifying very little
liberalization at all. As a result, no industry participants seem
happy with the Law, other than perhaps the third-tier brokers.
For the securities industry, the Law falls very far short of adopt-
ing reforms considered required: "securities" are not comprehen-
sively defined (in particular, securitized products are not generi-
cally included), 13 1 while banks are permitted to undertake a
good deal of securities business directly and the eventual pros-
pect of increased competition through bank subsidiaries looms
heavy. Under the announced regulations, the restrictions on se-
127. TATEWAKI, supra note 17, at 85.
128. The collapse of the Japanese stock markets dashed hopes of conversion of con-
vertible and warrant bonds to equity, leaving $134 billion in debt to be refinanced in
1992 and 1993, and another $35 billion in 1994. Alps Electric Co., an electronics parts
maker, has found that it must pay 7% in the Euromarkets today rather than 3% in the
1980s, despite the overall decline in dollar interest rates. Hardy, supra note 64, at C1.
129. It was hoped as recently as March 1992 that the passage of the Law would
mean that Japan's Glass-Steagall firewalls would come "tumbling down," with banks and
securities firms able to enter each others' areas freely by March 1993. See, e.g., Japan
Financial Woes Break Logjam for Reform of Banking System, TssOMSON'S INT'L BANK-
ING REGULATOR, March 23, 1992, at 1.
130. The shingikai reports themselves stopped short of tackling the biggest
problems they were supposed to address. See, e.g., Litt, supra note 75, at 752 (reform
proposals fail to transcend financial politics and seem instead to be a series of piecemeal
accommodations that do not change the basic features of the system).
131. See, e.g., Emiko Terazono, Investment Innovations on Horizon in Japan, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992, at 21 (characterization of asset-backed securities as "securities"
will promote development of market in Japan).
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curities firms' ability to conduct banking or trust banking busi-
ness through subsidiaries are themselves so heavy that even
Nomura Securities has indicated it may delay its entry into the
area.132 The city banks meanwhile regard the reforms announced
under the regulations as "little better than nothing," and are re-
sentful of the long-term credit banks' underwriting powers. 133
The failure to broaden the definition of "securities" reflects
a missed opportunity for the MOF itself, since products such as
real estate securitized interests (under supervision of the Minis-
try of Construction) and lease and installment sale securitized
products (under supervision of the MITI) could have been
brought under the protective umbrella of disclosure rules, anti-
fraud provisions, and the MOF's own supervisory jurisdiction.
As the gatekeeper over the speed at which liberalization will now
proceed, MOF's authority over its regulated institutions remains
intact, but the dissatisfaction of those institutions will create
continued political pressures on MOF to give way. If securities
markets remain depressed, and the securities industry finds it-
self unable to retain its former political clout with Japan's poliii-
cians, the balance of power that Article 65 has provided between
securities and banking firms is likely to shift decidedly towards
the banks. 13 4
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Japan's regulatory authorities have continued a slow process
of liberalization based on four broad principles: (1) that en-
hanced competitiveness in the financial service industry is a nec-
essary condition for increasing the availability of assets and ser-
vices to the economy; (2) that the financial structure must be
internationally compatible with other financial structures, espe-
cially those of major industrial powers; (3) that the financial
structure must reduce the potential for unfair trade practices;
132. Trust bank subsidiaries will be kept out of what are considered to be the most
profitable trust business areas, including loan trusts and specified money trusts (tokkin).
MOF Determines Details of Financial Deregulations, supra note 109.
133. MOF Determines Details of Financial Deregulations, supra note 109.
134. Article 65 has accomplished at least one of its original purposes by protecting
the securities industry against incursion by the banks, and so permitting them to develop
political strength now roughly comparable to that of the banks. Rosenbluth, supra note
11, at 63, 68. Whether this rough equality will continue is an open question, for the
political strength of the securities industry is linked to its ability to make political dona-
tions; and that ability in turn is linked to the level of activity in the stock markets.
Rosenbluth, supra note 11, at 67.
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and, (4) that the financial system must be able to manage risk in
such a manner as not to increase system risk.135 This has re-
sulted, in the 1 roadest sense, in a slow process of "securitiza-
tion" of Japan's financial system, away from bilateral, negoti-
ated, or customer-based ways of obtaining liquidity to methods
that rely on the exchange of assets for liquidity in open, less reg-
ulated, and wide participation markets.13 6
These changes have been very gradual, however, even under
good economic conditions. Japanese regulators are very wary of
any "Big Bang" approach to financial liberalization and become
anxious at the thought of unleashing the resources of the private
sector in an unfettered free market.1 3 7 They have accordingly
sought to guide the direction, and control the speed, of liberal-
izations as much as possible. This tendency has led some observ-
ers to refer to Japan's transition process as "bonsai" liberaliza-
tion, in which regulatory authorities are not willing to permit
competitive forces to play the same role they do in western fi-
nancial systems.
When economic conditions are difficult, this tendency is
magnified so that liberalization may virtually grind to a halt.
Certainly the timing of the Law is not auspicious for expanded
bank powers: Japan's stock and real estate market reversals and
its non-performing bank loan problems have raised questions
about the stability of the banking system3 8 and the role of gov-
135. Thomas F. Cargill & Shoichi Royama, The Evolution of Japanese Banking:
Isolation to Globalization, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, GAME PLANS FOR THE
'90s: THE 26TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETTON 491, 497-98
(1990).
136. The effects of this securitization process can be seen in four areas: (1) the de-
cline in the indirect finance ratio since 1975; (2) the decline in the market share of the
banking system; (3) the decline in the role of negotiated transactions in the flow of
funds; and, (4) the decline in the role of the main bank system. Statistics on these trends
can be found in CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 1.
137. As expressed by former Securities Bureau Director General Matsuno, "we are
not in a position to make risky experiments. We have to take a go-slow approach by
determining possible risks step-by-step along the way." Matsuno, supra note 99, at 7.
The United States view appears to hold that economic regulation must be justified by
reference to clear evidence of dysfunction in unregulated markets; otherwise, any inter-
ference with competitive market forces will be considered unnecessary or even counter-
productive. See Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified
Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REv. 314 (1990).
138. Japanese depositors are withdrawing funds from the ordinary banks for deposit
to the postal savings system, apparently out of concern for the financial condition of the
banks. See Clay Chandler, Japan's Banks Find Tough Rival in an Aggressive Postal
System, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1992, at A10. Meanwhile private estimates place the finan-
cial industry's non-performing loan portfolio as high as Y30 trillion, or $240 billion at
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ernment deposit guarantees. The government has responded in a
number of ways that raise questions about the future path of
Japanese finance. In August 1992, the government permitted
temporary accounting adjustments to reduce the balance sheet
impact of declining securities markets, reminiscent of United
States regulatory authorities' practice of forbearance. " ' In Sep-
tember, the government announced a major stimulus package of
almost 80 billion dollars to reverse the decline of the stock mar-
ket.140 While the stock market has responded positively, ques-
tions remain about the longer-term condition of the Japanese
economy.
The minimal liberalizations permitted by the regulations,
after such a long period of discussion and debate, indicate how
great the regulatory power of the MOF remains, and to what
extent the passage of the Law itself is only a blip along a line of
controlled shifts in the ordering of the financial system led by
the MOF. The work of the advisory councils over a five year pe-
riod gave industry, academics, "users," and government regula-
tors a say in how a new financial system should be ordered. This
permitted a consensus to be reached that allowed the final bill,
once submitted to the Diet, to be acted on quickly and with lit-
tle debate.14 ' At a time when the Glass-Steagall reform process
in the United States has been deadlocked,142 the Japanese pro-
cess in financial reform seems enviable. 43
current exchange rates, of which "a third is viewed as completely unrecoverable." Jon
Choy, Japanese Banks Attack Problem Loans, JAPAN EcON. INST. REP., Feb. 5, 1993, at
5. The non-performing loan problem may ultimately end up to be as costly to Japan as
the S&L problem has been in the United States. See, e.g., Douglas Ostrom, A Savings
and Loan-Style Crisis for Japan?, JAPAN ECON. INST. REP., Oct. 2, 1992, at 10-11.
139. Jon Choy, Government Braces Banks, Sparks Stock Market Rally, JAPAN
ECON. INST. REP., Aug. 28, 1992, at 1-3.
140. Jon Choy, Tokyo's Big Supplemental Budget Surprises And Pleases, JAPAN
ECON. INST. REP., Sept. 4, 1992, at 1.
141. Some 90% of bills introduced by the Japanese Government in the 1983 Diet
session were approved, a figure only somewhat higher than the historical average.
Mamoru Seki, The Drafting Process for Cabinet Bills, translated in 19 LAW IN JAPAN
168, 169 (1986).
142. The U.S. Congress has proved unwilling or unable to reach consensus on re-
form of Glass-Steagall. The most recent failed attempt to repeal Glass-Steagall has been
the U.S. Treasury proposal to restructure U.S. banking introduced in early 1991. The
final outcome of that proposal, however, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of December 1991, did not alter the structure of U.S. banking. See
Thomas F. Cargill & Thomas Mayer, U.S. Deposit Insurance Reform, CONTEMPORARY
POLICY ISSUES, July 1992, at 95, for a discussion of the Treasury proposal.
143. In the absence of Congressional direction, Glass-Steagall liberalization in the
United States has been left to piecemeal orders issued by the Federal Reserve Board,
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But at the same time, an aspect of the consensus-building
effort is that the MOF may place the balancing of vested politi-
cal interests ahead of real, or even theoretically consistent, fi-
nancial reform."" The failure of the Law to define "securities"
comprehensively is an example of this. Indeed, the minimal lib-
eralizations permitted by the regulations suggest that Japanese
financial reform announced under the Law is illusory.' 45 Preserv-
ing the status quo in the competitive balance of the banking and
securities industries, avoiding excessive competition in the se-
curities field, and giving the long-term credit banks a lead in se-
curities activities to offset their reduced powers under the new
Law are all matters of paramount importance to the MOF regu-
lators -- on equal or higher footing with the underlying goals of
transformation of the financial system itself. Tenuous financial
conditions have given the MOF sufficient justification to slow
the liberalization process, while at the same time reducing the
political power of market participants to demand liberalizations,
as well as their appetite for them. Real liberalization under the
Law is therefore several years off, although, as economic condi-
tions improve and participants demand more strongly the right
to engage in new activities that the new Law makes possible,
market forces will ultimately overwhelm the MOF's ability to
control a bonsai liberalization. The shift from traditional finan-
cial relationships to more open and competitive ones will there-
fore be on-going.
As that process resumes, Japan will have to face a funda-
mental problem not addressed by the Law - the conflict be-
tween enhanced opportunities to manage risk and government
incentives to assume that risk, including the role of government
which have then been subjected to a validation procedure through industry litigation in
the courts, leaving judges to sift through the legislative history from 1933 to reach basic
policy decisions concerning our financial system. See Litt, et al., supra note 59, for a
discussion of the "preclearance" and "postclearance" approaches taken in Japan and the
United States over the liberalization of the commercial paper market in each country.
144. It has been suggested that liberalization occurs in Japan only when regulations
no longer suit the needs of the financial institutions that benefitted from them in the
first place, and that the MOF seeks to adjust the interests of regulated parties only very
gradually, to avoid intrusions from the politicians, who have ultimate regulatory author-
ity. This means keeping policy outcomes in line with the political resources of competing
groups. Rosenbluth, supra note 11, at 101.
145. It is unclear whether the critical opposition to this definition was from the
banking industry or from other ministries within the government, who saw a comprehen-
sive definition of securities as a threat to their jurisdiction over a variety of presently
unregulated securitized products.
1993]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
deposit guarantees and moral hazard. As securities activities of
banks are slowly permitted to proceed, to what extent will in-
sured deposits (either explicitly insured as in the United States
or implicitly insured as in Japan) be used to support those se-
curities activities? Proponents of expanded powers argue that
firewalls to restrain capital flows can adequately be designed to
separate banking and securities activities. But if the walls are
thick enough to insulate insured deposits completely, what hap-
pens to the claimed efficiencies resulting from-expanded bank
powers? And if the walls are not thick enough to insulate in-
sured deposits completely, won't securities risk (or other non-
bank activity risk) be subsidized in part by government deposit
guarantees?
Japan's traditional view that the full faith and credit of the
government stands behind the financial system may generate
even more serious problems in the banking system than those
that have arisen in the United States. Recent efforts to support
the equity markets and to permit accounting adjustments to
hide financial problems, and a willingness to permit the postal
life insurance system to purchase equities, all suggest that the
Japanese regulatory authorities have not fully appreciated the
"moral hazard" problem inherent in the conflict between en-
hanced opportunities to assume risk and risk incentives embed-
ded in government deposit guarantees. Indeed, the global move-
ment toward universal banking has yet to address the problem
seriously if judged by the much publicized BIS capital
standards.
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